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Depressive Deficits in Recognition: Dissociation of
Recollection and Familiarity
Paula T. Hertel and Stephanie Milan
Dysphoric and nondysphoric students (48 women and 24 men) participated in an experiment that
was designed to separate automatic and controlled uses of memory in a modified recognition para
digm. First, they judged the relation of target words to paired words. Later they made recognition
decisions on target items alone or in the context of the original paired item. The use ofL. L. Jacoby's

( 1991) process

dissociation procedure revealed depressive deficits in estimates of recollection but

not in estimates of familiarity. T he paired test improved recollection for all subjects and showed a
trend in the direction of increased familiarity. These outcomes support approaches to depressive
cognition that emphasize impaired cognitive control.

Depressed mood is associated with deficient performance in
some tests of memory. Direct tests of free recall show the asso
ciation most frequently (see reviews by Hartlage, Alloy, Vaz
quez, & Dykman, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Ma
thews, 1988). Indirect tests of unaware remembering have not
yet shown it (see Roediger & McDermott, 1992). In the middle,
tests of recognition give mixed results. Watts, Morris, and Mac
Leod (1987) saw this mixture as a reflection of variations in the
sensitivity of recognition measures, and indeed there are now
several studies that have used signal-detection analyses to reveal
evidence of depression-related deficits in recognition accuracy
(e.g., Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Hertel & Hardin,
1990; Watts et al., 1987). Our purpose was to take a different
tack in the investigation of depressive performance on tests of
recognition. The approach rests on a theoretical analysis of rec
ognition processes developed by Jacoby (1991). We describe
this approach first and then relate the analysis to theoretical
frameworks for studying depressed moods and memory.
Recognition decisions can be based either on recollection of
an item's prior occurrence or on the more general sense that
the item feels familiar (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980).
Familiarity-based decisions need not involve attention to past
events; in that sense, they reflect automatic influences of prior
experience (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Recollection (remem
bering that an item occurred in a specific context) refers to con
scious reflection on the past. With this distinction in mind, Ja
coby (1991) argued that performance on memory tests in gen
eral involves both automatic and controlled uses of past

experience; recognition decisions in particular are based on
both feelings of familiarity and conscious recollection.
Jacoby and his colleagues (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth, &
Yonelinas, 1993) have developed a process dissociation frame
work for understanding the relative contributions of automatic
and controlled uses of memory in recognition and other tests.
Essentially, the approach is to place those two types of proce
dures in opposition to each other, through the use of different
test instructions. On an inclusion test for recognition, subjects
are instructed to endorse as old all items from two prior phases
of the experiment. Subjects respond on the basis of familiarity
or on the basis of recollecting a prior occurrence; familiarity
and recollection act together and in the same direction to facili
tate recognition of prior items. On the exclusion test, however,
subjects are instructed to exclude items from the first (or criti
cal) phase of the experiment, to call only items from Phase 2
old. In this case, familiarity and recollection operate in opposi
tion for Phase 1 items; subjects respond old only to the extent
that they are guided by familiarity, because if they recollect the
item's occurrence in Phase 1, they will correctly respond new.
Jacoby's (1991) framework makes certain assumptions about
the probability of responding old to an item from Phase 1 under
each instruction. In inclusion, the probability of responding old
(Oi) equals the probability that the item is recollected from
Phase l (R) or, if it is not recollected, the probability that it feels
familiar ([1 R]F). In exclusion, the probability of responding
old ( O.) simply equals the probability that the item is familiar
but not recollected from Phase 1 ([1
R]F). Therefore, the
probability that an item is recollected from Phase 1 can be cal
culated algebraically:
-

-
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Estimates of recollection are thus obtained by subtracting the
proportion of items judged old on the exclusion test from the
proportion judged old on the inclusion test. Estimates of famil
iarity are then derived by substitution.
The procedure is called process dissociation because a variety

comments.
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of independent variables have produced functional dissocia
tions in the estimates for recollection and familiarity (or similar
parameters in tests of stem completion). Relevant to our con
cern, several manipulations have affected estimates of the com
ponent for recollection but left estimates of the automatic com
ponent invariant. These include semantic versus nonsemantic
orienting tasks (Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, 1994), degree of at
tention (Jacoby et al., 1993), and list length (Yonelinas & Ja
coby, in press). In regard to recognition memory in particular,
Jacoby (1991) showed that dividing subjects' attention at the
time of the test reduces the size of the estimate for recollection
(disrupts it) but leaves the automatic effects of prior experience
intact (does not affect familiarity). Similarly, we intended to test
whether depressed or dysphoric states operate like divided at
tention at either study or test phases in reducing the recollective
aspect of recognition memory.
In the literature on depressive memory, several investigators
have argued that depressive impairments reflect reduced cogni
tive capacity (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Williams et al., 1988).
Resource allocation theory, for example, asserts that depressed
subjects' cognitive resources, perhaps because they are perva
sively consumed by self-relevant thoughts, are insufficient to
produce good performance on more resource-demanding tasks
(Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). With a different emphasis, we un
derstand such impairments as reflections of deficits in cognitive
initiative (Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Hertel & Rude, 1991). The
notion is that depressed people experience difficulties in moni
toring and self-sustained attention but that they are quite capa
ble of performing resource-demanding tasks when guided to use
procedures that nondepressed subjects perform on their own
initiative. For example, it has been shown that depressed and
dysphoric persons can benefit from procedures designed to hold
their attention on the task (Hertel & Rude, 1991) and to moni
tor the relevance of the past (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). Both the
cognitive-effort and the initiative perspectives on depressive
memory emphasize cognitive control as the locus of depressive
impairments. From both points of view, then, one may expect
deficits in estimates of recollection but not in estimates of fa
miliarity as a basis of recognition memory.
In addition to testing that prediction, a further goal of our
study was to determine which component of recognition was
affected by the reinstatement of prior context. Contextual cues
provided at the time of the test may increase the familiarity of
the target items. They may also improve recollection if they es
tablish a basis for distinguishing among items from the two lists.
In Phase I of this experiment, the subjects rated target words
for their degree of relation to paired words; in Phase 2, they
tried to learn another set of words presented singly. Then on
the test, Phase 1 targets were presented with the original paired
words, but Phase 2 words and distractors were presented with
new paired words. This paired test was administered to half of
the subjects, whereas the others saw single targets, Phase 2
words, and distractors. In short, the paired test provided context
that either made the target seem more or less familiar or estab
lished a basis for list discrimination to aid recollection. The pro
cess dissociation procedure ought to reveal the nature of these
contextual effects, as well as determine whether it depends on
the subject's emotional state. In searching for ways to repair
depressive deficits in cognitive control, we hoped that the paired

test would increase the recollective component of recognition
for dysphoric subjects.
In summary, because depressive deficits are typically attrib
uted to impaired cognitive control, we predicted a dissociation
in the component processes of recognition as a function of sub
jects' emotional state. Dysphoric subjects were expected to
show deficient recollective processes but unimpaired automatic
influences. Second, we sought to discover whether the deficit
in recollection would be partially repaired by the provision of
context from the rating phase at the time of the test.

Method

Overview
The experiment was run in three phases. In Phase I, all subjects rated
the semantic relatedness within 60 pairs of unrelated words. The first
members of the pairs served as target items on the later recognition test;
the second members provided context for the relatedness judgment. In
Phase 2, subjects listened to a tape of 60 additional words under expec
tations of a memory test. The sole purpose of Phase 2, however, was to
provide a set of words for the recognition test that would consistently
require a judgment of old. Without this phase subjects would be asked
to call all items new under the exclusion instructions.
In the final phase the recognition test was given. Words were ordered
in blocks according to instructions to include items from Phase I or to
exclude them. Half of the subjects in each mood condition took a single
item test; the others made recognition judgments about the first mem
bers of pairs, wherein the second members recapitulated the original
context of Phase I words. The second members for pairs of Phase 2 and
new words, of course, were new to the subjects. Subjects were told to
decide about the first word in the pair and were advised that the second
item in the pair might help them to decide.

Subjects
A total of 89 students initially participated in the experiment; the
final sample of72 was selected according to the following procedures.
Procedures for selection. First, we administered the Beck Depres
sion Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961)
to a lower division psychology class approximately 2 weeks before indi
vidual experimental sessions were scheduled; additional classes were
surveyed when needed throughout the period of the experiment. The
students did not sign the inventories but did provide a signed consent
form that was separated from the inventory after both forms were coded
with a subject number. After the inventories were scored, the subject
numbers of students selected for recruiting were assigned to conditions
of the experimental design in a manner that ensured counterbalancing
within each experimental and mood condition. Then the experimenter,
unaware of mood information, matched the subject number and condi
tion assignment with the student's name and called the student to re
quest participation. (Ten students declined the invitation.)
Students who scored over 9 (but generally higher) were recruited for
the dysphoric sample; students who scored from I to 7 were recruited
for the nondysphoric sample. Students received credit toward their
course grade for filling out the inventories and, separately, for partici
pating in the experiment.
At the end of the experimental session, the subjects filled out the BDI,
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lus
hene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), and a mood and health questionnaire,
sealed them in envelopes coded with subject numbers, and returned the
envelopes. The subjects were led to believe that the packet of inventories
was not related to the topic of the experiment. Items on the question-
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Table I
Mean Scores on the Mood Indexes
Dysphoric

Index
Beck Depression Inventory
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
State
Trait

Nondysphoric

Single
item

Paired

Single
item

17.7

17.1

4.9

3.2

48.8
51.4

53.3
53.2

40.5
35.7

36.1
39.3

Paired

Note. Scores are reported by mood (dysphoric vs. nondysphoric) and test condition (single item vs.
paired). n = 18 for all Beck Depression Inventory and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State scale adminis
trations; for State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait scale, n s = 17, 17, 15, and 17, respectively.

naire allowed us to verify the dysphoric and nondysphoric states of the

Test list.

The practice section of the test list consisted of 3 words

subjects. We set aside the data from 8 subjects whose BDI scores did not

(one of each valence) from each of the six original groups . These words

remain in the initial category or whose responses on the questionnaire

were assigned to one of two practice blocks-one inclusion and one

clearly ruled out a dysphoric state (see Deardorff & Funabiki, 1985).

Final sample.

The data from an additional 9 subjects (5 nondys

exclusion-of 9 words each. Responses to these 18 items were not
analyzed.

phoric and 4 dysphoric) were set aside because they clearly misun

The main part of the test list consisted of the remaining 27 words

derstood the instructions about inclusion and exclusion. Twelve women

from each of the six original groups. They were redistributed across six

and 6 men were assigned to each of the conditions that resulted from

test blocks of 27 words each. Each test block contained 9 Phase I words,

the combination of mood (dysphoric vs. nondysphoric) and type of test

9 Phase 2 words, and 9 new words. Three test blocks were assigned to

(single-item vs. paired). Also, in each condition, 3 subjects were as

inclusion and three, to exclusion instructions, with the order alternated

signed to each of the six word-presentation conditions, which we de

across blocks. Therefore, under each instruction the subjects saw 27

scribe later; one assignment error (for a dysphoric subject taking the

words they had rated, 27 they had heard, and 27 that were new.

single-item test) resulted in uneven sample sizes across the word-pre

Within each block of 27, the words were grouped according to va

sentation conditions. The average number of days between the first and

lence. The order of presentation within valence was random but limited

second administration of the BDI was 16.

to no consecutive occurrences from the same experimental list.

Mean scores on the postexperimental BDI and the STAI are listed in

In the test phase the words occurred as single items for one half of the

Table I. These means reliably differed in terms of mood group but not

subjects and as the first members of pairs for the other half. In the paired

for the type of test. Bivariate correlations among these measures ranged

condition the words were presented together with their partner from the

from .73 to .78 and were all reliable.

Phase 1 rating task. For Phase 2 and new words, we used the partners
that appeared when those words were Phase I words for other subjects.

Materials
Ta rget words.

From Ku�ra and Francis (1967), we selected 180

nouns and adjectives with frequencies below 70. All words contained
five, six, or seven letters. One third were neutral, one third negative, and
one third positive in emotional valence. 1
The 180 words were placed in six groups, each of which contained

Procedure
Phase I.

First, the subjects were instructed to judge the degree of

semantic relatedness within each of 60 word pairs. They were told that
many of the words in the pairs would not seem to be very related but
that, nevertheless, they should make their judgments carefully. Each
was

equal numbers of words from each valence and part of speech. Word

pair of words

frequency and length were closely balanced. Next, two of the six groups

centered on the screen; words appeared in white against a black back

presented for 2 s on the same line (target first) and

were assigned to each of three experimental lists; one of the two groups

ground. With their offset, a scale from 1 (unrelated) to 5

(very related)

later used on the inclusion test and the other, on the

appeared at the bottom of the screen for 2 s. The subjects responded by

exclusion test. The purpose of the three main lists was, however, to pro

pressing the number key that corresponded to their judgment. After a

vide 60 items each for Phase I (relatedness ratings), Phase 2 (heard

blank screen that lasted 500 ms, the next pair of words appeared.

on each list

was

items), and the test (new items). During the test each subject encoun
tered all l80 words but in different roles (rated, heard, or new items) and

Phase 2.

Next, the subjects were told to listen carefully to a list of

recorded words in anticipation of a later memory test. They were told

under different instructions (inclusion or exclusion). These two factors
produced the six counterbalanced, word-presentation conditions.

Listsfor Phase 1 and Phase 2.

The words on each of the three main

lists were randomly ordered for presentation during Phase I or Phase 2,
with the exceptions that no 2 words of the same valence or from the
same original block appeared consecutively. For presentation during

included as a factor in the design,
recollection or
familiarity.,No �evicJcm;e was found; instead, a serie&Dfmain effects
1

Emotional valence was originally

in an attempt to obtain evidence for mood-congruent

To construct the rating task in Phase I, each word was paired with an

revealed that neptiVe words were endorsed most frequently (positive
next and neut{Jd least) when they served as new items or heard items or
were used in the exclusion test. Estimates of familiarity were highest for
negative words; estimates of recollection were lowest. These differences

extralist word of the same length, part of speech , and frequency. Each

may be attributed to the fact that negative words were most emotional

Phase 2, each list was tape recorded by a female experimenter at a rate
of approximately 1.5 s per word.

paired word was emotionally neutral, semantically unrelated to the

and to the probability that they were interrelated to a greater degree

target word (according to the judgment of the authors and an experi

than

menter), and followed it on the same line in the computer display.

discriminable.

were

words

in

the

other

categories

and

therefore

least

739

DEPRESSION AND RECOGNITION

that the list was long and that they would not be expected to remember
all the words. They might, however, want to repeat the words to them
selves or to do whatever normally facilitated their memory. The tape
contained 60 words, read at a 1.5-s rate.
Test. In the final phase the words on the test list were presented for
6 s each in the middle of the screen, either alone or as the first word in a
pair, depending on the testing condition to which the subject had been
assigned. Under both inclusion and exclusion conditions, the subjects
responded by pressing keys labeled old and new. The Nand V keys on
the keyboard were used for this purpose; the subjects rested their index
fingers on those keys. A blank screen of 500-ms duration separated dis
plays; responses that were made after the offset of the item were counted
as missing.
Before each practice block and test block, the screen displayed the
instruction for the upcoming set of items. These instructions read, "In
clude items from Phase I by typing OLD" and "Exclude items from
Phase I by typing NEW." For half of the subjects, the first practice block
was an inclusion block, and for the other half it was an exclusion block;
blocks then were alternated between instructions, although the order of
words remained constant. These first two instructional screens were
used as opportunities to remind the subjects about the requested judg
ments. When ready to proceed, the subjects pressed a key to begin the
block.
At the beginning of the single-item test phase, the subjects read the
following instructions:
The next task is a recognition task. You will be asked to recognize
words from the previous phases in one of two ways. First, when the
instruction to INCLUDE is given, your task is to strike the OLD
key if the item occurred previously in this experiment. You may
remember that the item occurred as the first member of a pair on
the computer screen, or you may remember the item from the au
dio tape. Strike NEW only if you do not remember the item from
either phase. In other words, when you are told to INCLUDE,
strike OLD if the item was previously presented and NEW if it
was not. Second, when the instruction to EXCLUDE is given, you
should exclude items from Phase I (the ones you judged on the
computer). If the item feels familiar but you remember that it oc
curred in Phase I, strike NEW. Also strike NEW if it is a new item .
Strike OLD only if the item seems familiar but you do not remem
ber it occurring in Phase I on the computer. By the way, the second
members of the pairs in Phase 1 will not appear as items in these
tasks. Please note that you will always strike OLD to items from
the audio tape. However, you should not try to remember the tape;
that's too hard. Just trust that if an item seems familiar but you do
not remember it from Phase I, it was probably on the tape.

Table 2
Mean Estimates of Recollection and Familiarity
(and Standard Deviations)
Measure and group
Recollection
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric
Familiarity
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric
Note.

n =

Single item

Paired

.31(.19)
. 20 (. 24)

.54 (. 20)
.40 (.24)

.45(.14)
.50(.13)

.56 (.24)
.55(.24)

18.

curred in Phase I, strike NEW. Also strike NEW if it is a new item.
Strike OLD only if the item seems familiar but you do not remem
ber it occurring in Phase I on the computer. Please note that you
will always strike OLD to items from the audio tape. However, you
should not try to remember the tape; that's too hard. Just trust that
if an item seems familiar but you do not remember it from Phase
I, it was probably on the tape.
Before the subjects began the practice trials, the experimenter asked
them to paraphase the instructions; they discussed the instructions until
the experimenter was satisfied that they understood.

Results

Estimates ofRecollection and Familiarity
First, the proportions of rated words judged old under inclu
sion and exclusion instructions were converted to estimates of
recollection and familiarity (Jacoby, 1991). These estimates
were separately submitted to analyses of variance, with be
tween-subjects factors for mood (nondysphoric vs. dysphoric)
and the type of test (single-item vs. paired). (The significance
level was set at .05 for these and subsequent analy ses.) Means
and standard deviations are displayed in Table 2.
Estimates of recollection showed two reliable main effects.
First, dysphoric subjects recollected fewer rated words (.30 vs.
.43 for nondy sphoric subjects), F(I, 68) 5.73,MS. .05. Sec
ond, recollection was lower on the single-item test than on the
paired test (.25 vs. .47), F( l , 68)
18.26. The interaction was
not reliable (F < 1.00).
Estimates of familiarity showed no reliable differences. The
paired test, however, tended to produce greater familiarity (.56
.04, p < I 0.
2. 83 MS.
vs. . 48 in the single test), F( 1, 68)
Other effects did not approach statistical significance (Fs <
1.00).
The results of these analyses provide evidence for a functional
dissociation between recollection and familiarity that was es
tablished by subjects' emotional state; dysphoric subjects
showed impaired recollection but similar levels of familiarity
based recognition. We gained further evidence of the indepen
dence of the two components by evaluating correlations be
tween the estimates within each group of subjects and finding
nonreliable associations (p > .I 0): in the nondysphoric group,
r (34)
.23, and in the dysphoric group, r (34) -.12.
The assumption of independent components also relies on
evidence that the same criteria for responding old were used
under both inclusion and exclusion instructions. We next re=

=

=

These instructions were modified for subjects in the paired test con
dition. They were told:
The next task is a recognition task. Pairs of words will appear on
the screen, one pair at a time. You will be asked to determine if the
first word in the pair occurred in the previous phases. If the first
word was in Phase I, when you judged words on the computer, you
can trust that the second word was also paired with it in Phase I.
But if the first word was not in Phase I, the second word on the
screen will be a new word. You will make decisions about the first
words of the pairs in one of two ways, and you may find that the
second words help you to make those decisions. First, when the
instruction to INCLUDE is given, your task is to strike the OLD
key if the item occurred previously in this experiment. You may
remember that the item occurred as the first member of a pair on
the computer screen, or you may remember the item from the au
dio tape. Strike NEW only if you do not remember the item from
either phase. In other words, when you are told to INCLUDE,
strike OLD if the item was previously presented and NEW if it
was not. Second, when the instruction to EXCLUDE is given, you
should exclude items from Phase I (the ones you judged on the
computer). If the item feels familiar but you remember that it oc-

=

=

,

=

=

.
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Table 3
Mean Percentages of Words Judged Old (and Standard Deviations)
Single item
Phase and group
Phase I
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric
Phase 2
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric
New distractors
Nondysphoric
Dysphoric
Note.

n =

Paired

Inclusion

Exclusion

Inclusion

Exclusion

62(13)
61(13)

32(13)
41(18)

79(16)
74(18)

24(13)
34(21)

65(16)
67(10)

58(17)
58(13)

50(16)
50(15)

49(15)
52(14)

23(14)
27(13)

22(12)
24(14)

19 (II)
20(12)

19(14)
20(13)

18.

port results from an analysis of the percentage of new items
judged old, which was used to evaluate such evidence.

Percentage Judged Old
Table 31ists means and standard deviations of the percentages
of Phase 2 and new words judged old. (It also presents the same
information for Phase I words, so that the nature of the esti
mates reported earlier can be better evaluated.) All percentages
were based on a total of 27 items, with items for which no re
sponse was obtained omitted (less than I % of trials, on average).
The percentages were separately submitted to analyses of vari
ance for Phase 2 and new words. Each design included between
subjects factors for mood and type of test and a within-subjects
factor for instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion). Reliable main
effects are not routinely reported when they are qualified by
reliable interactions.
New items. Again, the assumption about the independence
of recollection and familiarity rests on evidence for the use of
similar criteria in responding under inclusion and exclusion in
structions. The most straightforward index of such criteria is
supplied by responses to new items. The percentage of new
words judged old did not vary reliably according to any of the
three factors in the design. However, the results showed a trend
in which subjects who took the paired test made fewer of these
errors; the mean percentages of distractors judged old were
19.3% on the paired test and 23.8% on the single-item test, F( I ,
68) = 3.21, MS. = 230.20. p < . I 0. No such trends were found
for instructions to include versus exclude or for any other effects
in the design (all Fs < 1.00). In short, these results do not chal
lenge the independence assumption, nor do they call into ques
tion comparisons between the two mood groups. They do, how
ever, suggest that all subjects may have used different criteria for
judging test items as a function of the presence or absence of
paired words. Therefore, comparisons of recollection and fa
miliarity across the type of test must be viewed with caution.
Phase 2 items. The percentage of heard words judged old
differed reliably according to the type of test, F(l, 68) = 15.42,
MS. = 313.79. Subjects in the single-item condition endorsed
61.7% of heard words on average, compared with 50.1% for sub
jects in the paired condition. This difference is not surprising, if
one considers that the partners on the paired test were new to

subjects' experience; their presence on the test ought to have
reduced the overall feeling of familiarity established by the dis
play or may even have provided misleading routes for
recollection.
Although the level of endorsement of heard items appears to
be at chance on the paired test, subjects clearly endorsed many
more heard than new items, which suggests that some degree of
discrimination occurred.
Of greater importance is the reliable interaction of type of
test with instructions, F(l , 68) = 5.26, MS. = 114.04. On the
paired test, subjects endorsed the same percentage of heard
words under each instruction (50.1%), but the subjects who
took the single-item test endorsed more words under instruc
tions to include (65.7% vs. 57.7% under exclusion). This in
teraction is addressed in the Discussion. Apart from the main
effect of instructions, no other effects approached statistical sig
nificance (Fs < 1.00).

Performance Across Blocks
A final set of analyses was performed on all measures of rec
ognition by including a factor for blocks of items. There were
three blocks of trials under both inclusion and exclusion in
structions, with 9 items included in each. Instructions al
ternated, but the order was counterbalanced within experimen
tal and mood groups. We report only the reliable effects that
involved the blocking factor, alone or in combination with other
factors in each design. Although our predictions did not con
cern such a factor, a reasonable question to ask is whether per
formance by dysphoric subjects deteriorated across blocks to a
greater degree than what was the case for nondysphoric
subjects.
Estimates of recollection and familiarity. Estimates of rec
ollection2 decreased across the three blocks (.44, .35, and .30)
regardless of mood and test conditions, F(2, 136) = 8.13, MS.
.05. Similarly, estimates of familiarity also decreased but only
=

2 The basis for the drop in recollection was a drop in the percentage
of targets judged old on the inclusion test (78%, 68%, and 61% across
blocks); percentages were fairly constant during exclusion (34%, 34%,
and 31%).

DEPRESSION AND RECOONITION

on the single-item test. The interaction3 of blocks with type of
test was reliable, F(2, 130) 4.42, MSe .04. Mean estimates
were .62, .47, and .38 on the single-item test and .55, .55, and
.50 on the paired test. The provision of prior context apparently
maintained a rather constant sense of familiarity across blocks
of trials.
Percentage of items judged old. For all subjects new words
were endorsed less frequently across blocks (24%, 22%, and
19%), F(2, 136)
3.74, MSe
230.59. Finally, heard words
were also endorsed less frequently across blocks (65%, 54%, and
50%), F(2, 136)
24.21, MSe
356.90. In general, subjects
became more conservative in their willingness to judge items as
old as the number of test items increased.
=

=

=

=

=

=

Discussion
The primary finding in this study was a depressive impair
ment in the recollective component of recognition memory, in
the absence of differences in estimates of familiarity. This find
ing is consistent with theories that predict impairments in con
trolled processing (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hertel & Har
din, 1990; Williams et al., 1988). Without the process dissocia
tion procedure, however, the results from the (ty pical) inclusion
condition in Phase I and from Phase 2 recognition showed com
parable performance across mood.
Depressed mood is yet another factor that establishes a disso
ciation between two components of performance on tests of
memory. One component is generally taken to reflect the auto
matic effects of past experience. Jacoby (1991, p. 532) defined
automatic influences of memory as those influences that re
main constant, regardless of one's intention to remember. They
affect recognition judgments even when one is trying to oppose
or counteract the effects of the past, as is the case under exclu
sion instructions. The conscious recollective component is de
fined purely in terms of the difference in performance that re
sults from intent to use versus not use past experience in per
forming a current task. Such definitions avoid the problems
that arise in trying to define controlled versus automatic pro
cesses purely in terms of single testing conditions or response
characteristics.4
Like Jacoby, we prefer to think of performance on memory
tests in componential terms rather than to assume that different
types of tests tap different unitary processes. In the latter regard,
however, a number of investigators have shown that depressed
moods are associated with differences on explicit memory tests
but not on those of implicit memory (Denny & Hunt, 1992;
Hert el & Hardin, 1990; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, &
Fuller, !992). Tests of explicit memory-like free and cued re
call-are more likely in a relative sense to invite recollective
or controlled procedures, whereas implicit-memory tests-like
stem and fragment completion-are more likely to invite auto
matic influences of prior experience with the materials. Each
type of test, however, can be shown to vary in the extent to which
that tendency holds (see Jacoby et al., 1993).
Why were depressive deficits found in recollection but not in
feelings of familiarity? In comparison with recollective compo
nents of retrieval, a sense of familiarity is less likely to be
affected by the degree of controlled processing during initial
exposure in Phase I (see Jacoby et a!., 1993). If depression lim-
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ited the degree of cognitive control during a study phase, then
the effects would be seen in controlled procedures at test. This
reasoning follows the general scheme known as transfer-appro
priate processing (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Alter
natively, if depression were not associated with differences in
Phase I processing, deficits in recollection would simply reflect
the lack of controlled reference to the past at the time of the test
and the possibly heavier reliance on feelings of familiarity.
We did not examine possible differences in the use of con
trolled procedures during Phase I. Instead, we manipulated the
conditions under which recognition judgments were made in an
attempt to improve cognitive control on the test. The
representation of the partners from the initial rating task ex
erted several effects. First, the paired test clearly increased rec
ollection, but it also tended to elevate familiarity. These effects
on the parameter estimates, however, must be understood cau
tiously in the context of other effects of the type of test. The
subjects tended to endorse fewer new items on the paired test
than on the single-item test (although not reliably so); they were
also more conservative in endorsing previously heard words.
Both of these differences could well reflect the presence of the
new partners with the heard and new items presented for recog
nition. An unfamiliar context would of course not aid recollec
tion of the heard words and further would make all such
items-heard and new-seem less familiar, but old partners
would elevate recollection, familiarity, or both.
In the absence of old partners, list discrimination was more
difficult. Recollection of Phase I targets can be seen as a prob
lem in list discrimination that arose primarily on the exclusion
test. Furthermore, this interpretation is relevant to the effect
of instructions on single-item recognition of heard words from
Phase 2. On the single-item test, lower rates of endorsing Phase
2 words under exclusion may have reflected false recollection
(Phase 2 words that were excluded on the basis of believing that
they had occurred in Phase I ). This problem in list discrimina
tion is central to performance on exclusion trials. That is, when

3 The data from 3 subjects in the paired test were missing from this
analysis. They recollected all words in at least one of the blocks, and so
the estimate of familiarity was indeterminate.
4 As discussed by Jacoby, Toth, and Yonelinas(1993), the process dis
sociation procedure is both similar to and different from procedures
that rely on signal detection theory. Like the process dissociation proce
dure, signal detection theory is based on an independence assumption:
Discriminability and bias are independent contributors to performance
on recognition tests. Signal detection theory, however, is a single-process
theory with respect to memory components, whereas the process disso
ciation procedure includes two memory components. The familiarity
component of the process dissociation procedure, moreover, can be un
derstood to include the subcomponents of guessing influenced by prior
exposure in the experiment and guessing influenced by uncontrolled
bias. The component for familiarity can therefore be analyzed with sig
nal detection methods to correct estimates on the basis of uncontrolled
guessing; d' can measure the memory subcomponent of familiarity. An
alternative method is to subtract base rates (proportion of new items
endorsed) from familiarity estimates. For our results this method pro
duced average estimates of familiarity {corrected for guessing) of .24 on
the single-item test and .36 on the paired test but no differences associ
ated with mood. (For a more thorough treatment of these issues , see
Jacoby et a!., 1993.)
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the same problem characterizes judgments about Phase 1
words, such words are not excluded. In this sense one may say
that something is familiar when one has encountered it before
but does not know where. In keeping with this line of reasoning,
list discrimination for Phase 2 items is arguably less of a prob
lem on the paired test; the new partners provide information to
rule out Phase I membership.
Regardless of whether our interpretations of effects from the
test and instruction manipulations are correct, we emphasize
that none of these effects depended on mood. Any notion that
dysphoric subjects were given particular advantage by aids for
list discrimination or by increased familiarity was unsup
ported. Therefore, the degree of controlled processing during
Phase I may have been responsible for the depressive deficit in
recollection. It is important to keep in mind, however, that dis
tinguishing between encoding versus retrieval explanations is
ultimately impossible (see Watkins, 1990). Cognitive control on
the test may have been affected in ways unrelated to our manip
ulation of context.
In very general terms, depressive deficits in controlled proce
dures are consistent with neuropsychological evidence in regard
to attention and depression. Recent research has identified re
gions of the frontal Jobes as loci of cognitive procedures in
volved in voluntary attention, monitoring, and other metacog
nitive activities (see the review by Mayes, 1988). Moscovitch
and Winocur (1992), for example, provided evidence that di
viding the attention of neurologically unimpaired subjects
mimics effects of frontal-lobe damage. Another example is
Posner's ( 1992) use of positron emission tomography tech
niques to observe increased activation in certain frontal regions
during prolonged maintenance of attention. Such scans have
also revealed that hypometabolism in the frontal lobes corre
lates with degree of depression, as do strokes that primarily
affect the left frontal region (Resnick, 1992). Thus, there are
possible neurophysiological bases for inferring that depressed
moods are associated with reduced cognitive control.
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